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Abstract
In this paper we attempt to analyze the concept of quantum probability within quantum computa-
tion and quantum computational logic. While the subjectivist interpretation of quantum probabil-
ity explains it as a reliable predictive tool for an agent in order to compute measurement outcomes,
the objectivist interpretation understands quantum probability as providing reliable information of
a real state of affairs. After discussing these different viewpoints we propose a particular objectivist
interpretation grounded on the idea that the Born rule provides information about an intensive
realm of reality. We then turn our attention to the way in which the subjectivist interpretation
of probability is presently applied within both quantum computation and quantum computational
logic. Taking as a standpoint our proposed intensive account of quantum probability we discuss
the possibilities and advantages it might open for the modeling and development of both quantum
computation and quantum computational logic.
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Introduction
The notion of probability has been, since its origin, at the center of foundational debates in Quantum
Mechanics (QM). As it is well known, the so called “ignorance interpretation” applied in classical
Kolmogorovian probability theory was found out to be incompatible with the formalism of the theory
of quanta. The impossibility to interpret quantum probability in classical terms, as providing partial
information of an actually existent, but unknown, state of affairs played an important role within
many philosophical discussions and debates taking place between the founding fathers of the theory
during the first half of the last century. Today, the problem remains still open and there is no general
consensus inside the philosophical community regarding the meaning of the famous (probabilistic) Born
rule. In fact, rather than getting closer to a consensus, the number of interpretations of probability
has multiplied through the course of the years. In this article we attempt to analyze probability
by discussing two general viewpoints. While the first considers quantum probability as a reliable
predictive tool used by agents in order to compute measurement outcomes, the second understands
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it as providing a reliable informational source of a real state of affairs —as theoretically described by
QM. We will investigate how these different accounts of the Born rule provide a radically different
perspective regarding the modeling of quantum computational processes.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we provide a short introduction to quantum
probability and its orthodox account. Section 2 analyses the subjectivist interpretation of quantum
probability which argues that the Born rule can be understood as a reliable tool that can be used by
an agent in order to bet on possible measurement outcomes. Section 3 introduces a new objectivist
interpretation of quantum probability as providing a reliable informational source of a real intensive
state of affairs theoretically described by QM. Section 4 provides a general analysis of the different
ways in which the notion of probability is used in quantum computation and quantum computational
logic. Taking as a standpoint our objectivist interpretation of probability, in section 5, we present a
new intensive approach to the modeling of quantum computational processes which provides several
advantages with respect to the orthodox modeling. Finally, we present the conclusions of the paper.
1 Quantum probability
Since Born’s 1926 interpretation of the quantum wave function, Ψ, probability has become one of
the key notions in the description of quantum phenomena. The rule provided a reliable account of
statistical outcomes; however, contrary to the expectations of many, it did not explain how single
results suddenly appeared. In his paper, Born formulated the now-standard interpretation of ψ(x)
as encoding a probability density function for a certain particle to be found at a given region. For
a state ψ, the associated probability function is ψ∗ψ, which is equal to |ψ(x)|2. If |ψ(x)|2 has a
finite integral over the whole of three-dimensional space, then it is possible to choose a normalizing
constant. The probability that a particle is within a particular region V is the integral over V of
|ψ(x)|2. However, even though this interpretation worked fairly well, it soon became evident that the
concept of probability in the new theory departed from the physical notion considered in classical
statistical mechanics as lack of knowledge about a preexistent (actual) state of affairs described in
terms of definite valued properties. According to Born himself:
“Schro¨dinger’s quantum mechanics [therefore] gives quite a definite answer to the question of the
effect of the collision; but there is no question of any causal description. One gets no answer to the
question, ‘what is the state after the collision’ but only to the question, ‘how probable is a specified
outcome of the collision’. Here the whole problem of determinism comes up. From the standpoint
of our quantum mechanics there is no quantity which in any individual case causally fixes the
consequence of the collision; but also experimentally we have so far no reason to believe that there
are some inner properties of the atom which condition a definite outcome for the collision. [...] I
myself am inclined to give up determinism in the world of the atoms. But that is a philosophical
question for which physical arguments alone are not decisive.” [61, p. 57]
Albert Einstein was clearly mortified by the lack of intuitive (anschaulich) spacio-temporal content
of the theory of quanta and the introduction of the strange role played by measurement. Indeed,
according to the projection postulate, explicitly included by von Neumann in his famous axiomatic
formulation of QM, a sudden “collapse” of the quantum wave function is induced every time a subject
performs a measurement. Einstein would argue —almost in complete solitude— that “the moon has
a definite position whether or not we look at the moon. [...] Observation cannot create an element
of reality like position, there must be something contained in the complete description of physical
reality which corresponds to the possibility of observing a position, already before the observation has
been actually made.” His unease with QM was mainly related to the consideration of a theory as an
algorithmic recipe: “I still believe in the possibility of a model of reality [...] a theory which represents
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things themselves and not merely the probability of their occurrence” [28]. At the very opposite side,
the centrality of the subject within the new theory of quanta was completely embraced by Niels Bohr
who even argued that the most important (epistemological) lesson of QM is that, we subjects, are not
merely spectators but also actors in the great drama of (quantum) existence.
In the history of physics the development of probability took place through a concrete physical
problem considered in the 18th Century. The physical problem was how to characterize a state of
affairs even though the possessed knowledge of it was incomplete. Or in other words, how to deal
with gambling. This physical problem was connected later on to a mathematical theory developed
by Laplace and others. But it was only at the beginning of 20th Century that Kolmogorov was
able to axiomatize this mathematical theory [43]. Anyhow, even though there are still today many
interpretational problems regarding the physical understanding of classical probability, when physicists
talk about probability in statistical mechanics they discuss about the (average values of) properties of
an uncertain —but existent— state of affairs.1 This is why the problem to determine a definite state of
affairs in QM —the sets of definite valued properties which characterize the quantum system— poses
also problems to the interpretation of probability within the theory itself. As noticed by Schro¨dinger
in a letter to Einstein:
“It seems to me that the concept of probability [related to quantum theory] is terribly mishandled
these days. Probability surely has as its substance a statement as to whether something is or is
not the case —an uncertain statement, to be sure. But nevertheless it has meaning only if one is
indeed convinced that the something in question quite definitely is or is not the case. A probabilistic
assertion presupposes the full reality of its subject. [8, p. 115]
Schro¨dinger [53, p. 156] knew very well that in QM it is not possible to assign a definite value to all
properties of a quantum state. As he remarked: “[...] if I wish to ascribe to the [quantum mechanical]
model at each moment a definite (merely not exactly known to me) state, or (which is the same) to
all determining parts definite (merely not exactly known to me) numerical values, then there is no
supposition as to these numerical values to be imagined that would not conflict with some portion of
quantum theoretical assertions.” This impossibility would be exposed three decades after in formal
terms by Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker in their now famous theorem [42] —to which we shall
return in the next section. In 1981, Luigi Accardi proved that there is a direct link between Bell
inequalities and probability models [1]. The theorem of Accardi states that any theory which violates
Boole-Bell inequalities2 has a non-Kolmogorovian probability model. Consequently, QM —which is
known to violate these inequalities— possesses a probability model which cannot be related to our
classical understanding of reality (see for a detailed analysis [58]). Of course, a possibility —that
triggered Bell’s investigation— is to follow the path inaugurated by Bohmian theory and change the
formalism of QM in order to retain the classical representation of physics in terms of particles with
well defined positions in space-time. As argued by Bohm:
“[...] in the usual interpretation two completely different kinds of statistics are needed. First, there
is the ordinary statistical mechanics, which treats of the distortion of systems among the quantum
states, resulting from various chaotic factors such as collisions. The need of this type of statistics
could in principle be avoided by means of more accurate measurements which would supply more
1In this respect it is important to remark that the orthodox interpretation of probability in terms of relative frequencies
refers to ‘events’ and not to ‘properties of a system’. This frequentist interpretation of probability is not necessarily linked
to a realistic physical representation but rather supports an empiricist account of the observed measurement results.
2As remarked by Itamar Pitowsky [51, p. 95]: “In the mid-nineteenth century George Boole formulated his ‘conditions
of possible experience’. These are equations and inequalities that the relative frequencies of (logically connected) events
must satisfy. Some of Boole’s conditions have been rediscovered in more recent years by physicists, including Bell
inequalities, Clauser Horne inequalities, and many others.”
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detailed information about the quantum state, but in systems of appreciable complexity, such
measurements would be impracticably difficult. Secondly, however, there is the fundamental and
irreducible probability distribution, P (x) = |ψ(x)|2 [...]. The need of this type of statistics cannot
even in principle be avoided by means of better measurements, nor can it be explained in terms of
the effects of random collision processes. [...] On the other hand, the causal interpretation requires
only one kind of probability. For as we have seen, we can deduce the probability distribution
P (x) = |ψ(x)|2 as a consequence of the same random collision processes that give rise to the
statistical distributions among the quantum states.” [6, p. 456]
Changing the perspective of the problem but staying close to the orthodox mathematical formalism
it is also possible to understand quantum probability in terms of the ignorance, not of a real existent
state of affairs, but of an agent’s knowledge of the future actualization of a measurement outcome. This
account of probability, which goes under the name of the subjectivist interpretation, has provided a
ground in the last decades for two of todays most popular interpretations of QM: Quantum Bayesianism
and the many worlds interpretation.
2 Quantum probability as an agent’s reliable tool (in order to com-
pute future measurement outcomes)
Many leading figures like Einstein, Schro¨dinger, Pauli and Heisenberg were certainly interested in
metaphysics and the referential relation of physical theories to nature and reality. However, the prag-
matic and instrumentalist understanding of science radicalized after the success of the Manhattan
project in the IIWW closed the door to foundational questions. This was at least until in the 1980s
Aspect and his group were able to prove the violation of the Boole-Bell inequality in an EPR type
experiment. As remarked by Jeff Bub [9]: “[...] it was not until the 1980s that physicists, computer
scientists, and cryptographers began to regard the non-local correlations of entangled quantum states
as a new kind of non-classical resource that could be exploited, rather than an embarrassment to
be explained away.” This new situation reopened the door to foundational problems which, in turn,
placed the meaning of quantum probability —once again— as a central topic of debate. However, the
analysis of quantum probability was still surrounded by the widespread anti-realist attitude towards
the understanding of QM. As explained by Healey [35]: “[T]he instrumentalist takes theoretical state-
ments to be neither true nor false of the world, science to aim only at theories that accommodate and
predict our observations, and theories even in mature science to have given us increasingly reliable
and accurate predictions only of things we can observe.” Instrumentalism, as an extreme form of
anti-realism, holds that QM is not a reliable theory in order to describe objective physical reality
(objective reliability), it can be considered reliable as an abstract mathematical symbolism which only
accounts for subjective observations (subjective reliability). In the year 2000, exactly one century after
the beginning of the quantum voyage, in a paper entitled Quantum Theory Needs no ‘Interpretation’
Christopher Fuchs and Asher Peres took the instrumentalist standpoint explicitly inside the philo-
sophical debate about the meaning and reference of QM. According to them: “[...] quantum theory
does not describe physical reality. What it does is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities
for the macroscopic events (‘detector clicks’) that are the consequences of experimental interventions.
This strict definition of the scope of quantum theory is the only interpretation ever needed, whether
by experimenters or theorists.” [32, p. 70] The ideas presented in this paper were further developed
by Fuchs and Ru¨diger Schack taking as a basis the Bayesian interpretation of probability [33]. Due to
their Bayesian standpoint in order to account for quantum theory, they called their approach quantum
Bayesianism, or in short: QBism.
David Mermin, an old friend of Peres, after having tried with no success to develop a realist account
of QM [45] recently converted into QBism. Together with Fuchs and Shack [33, p. 750] they wrote:
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“A measurement in QBism is more than a procedure in a laboratory. It is any action an agent takes
to elicit a set of possible experiences. The measurement outcome is the particular experience of that
agent elicited in this way. Given a measurement outcome, the quantum formalism guides the agent
in updating her probabilities for subsequent measurements.” Indeed, as QBists make explicitly clear:
“A measurement does not, as the term unfortunately suggests, reveal a pre-existing state of affairs.”
Measurements are personal, individual and QM is a reliable “tool” for the “user” —as Mermin prefers
to call the “agent” [46]. Just like a mobile phone or a laptop, QM is a tool that we subjects use in
order to organize our experience in a reliable manner.
“QBist takes quantum mechanics to be a personal mode of thought —a very powerful tool that any
agent can use to organize her own experience. That each of us can use such a tool to organize our
own experience with spectacular success is an extremely important objective fact about the world
we live in. But quantum mechanics itself does not deal directly with the objective world; it deals
with the experiences of that objective world that belong to whatever particular agent is making
use of the quantum theory.” [33, p. 751]
But the subjectivist interpretation of probability has not been used exclusively by anti-realist
approaches to QM. It has been also used by the now popular Many Worlds realist interpretation.
Attempting to make sense of the effectiveness of quantum computational processes David Deutsch
proposed the existence of “parallel” worlds in which computations actually take place. By considering
the theory of decision Deutsch proposed to explain the meaning of probability in purely subjective
terms and even claimed to have derived Born’s rule form subjective likehood [22]. This idea was devel-
oped by David Wallace who analyses the rational behavior of agents within the so called “multiverse”
[60].3 Adrian Kent summarizes the subjectivist approach in the following terms:
“One idea lately advocated by David Deutsch and David Wallace of the University of Oxford is
to try to use decision theory, the area of mathematics that concerns rational decision-making, to
explain how rational people should behave if they believe they are in a branching universe. Deutsch
and Wallace start from a few purportedly simple and natural technical assumptions about the
preferences one should have in a branching world and then claim to show that rational Everettians
should behave as though they were in an uncertain probabilistic world following the statistical laws
of quantum theory, even though they believe their true situation is very different.” [40, p. 6]
It is important to remark, that just like instrumentalists who detach the question of reference from
the analysis of quantum probability, the working mathematician does not need to constrain himself
to any set of metaphysical principles. Instead of wondering about the reference of a theory she is only
worried about the internal structure and coherency of the mathematical theory she is dealing with.
‘Probability’ is regarded by the mathematician as a ‘theory of mathematics’ and in this sense departs
from any conceptual physical understanding which relates the formal structure to the world around
us. A mathematician thinks of a probability model as the set of axioms which fit a mathematical
structure and wonders about the internal consistency rather than about how this structure relates
and can be interpreted in relation to experience and physical reality. As noticed by Hans Primas:
“Mathematical probability theory is just a branch of pure mathematics, based on some axioms
devoid of any interpretation. In this framework, the concepts ‘probability’, ‘independence’, etc.
are conceptually unexplained notions, they have a purely mathematical meaning. While there is
a widespread agreement concerning the essential features of the calculus of probability, there are
widely diverging opinions what the referent of mathematical probability theory is.” [52, p. 582]
3The subjectivist derivation of the Born rule by Deutsch and Wallace has received many criticism (e.g., [14, 25]).
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The important point is that when a mathematician and a physicist talk about ‘probability’ they need
not refer to the same concept. While for the mathematician the question of the relation between
the mathematical structure of probability and experience plays no significant role, for the physicist
who assumes a realist stance the question of probability is necessarily linked to experience and the
representation of physical reality.
The fact that the orthodox formalism of QM relates to a non-Kolmogorovian probability model is
not such a big issue from an instrumentalist perspective nor from a purely mathematical viewpoint. For
the instrumentalist, who is only worried about the predictive effectiveness of the mathematical model
this point might be regarded as irrelevant. The same situation happens with many mathematicians
working with these probability structures who do not get astonished in any way by them. However,
from a viewpoint which understands —following Einstein— that a physical theory must be capable
of providing a conceptual representation of physical reality, the question which arises is very deep,
namely, what is the meaning of a concept of probability which does not talk about the degree of
knowledge of an actual state of affairs? In this case, in what sense can probability be considered as
being objectively reliable? From our perspective, if such a question is not properly acknowledged, the
statement “QM is a theory about probabilities” looses all physical content. It might be regarded as
either an obvious mathematical statement with no interest —it only states the well known fact that
in QM there is a (non-Kolmogrovian) probability measure assigned via Gleason’s theorem4— or a
meaningless physical statement, since we do not know what quantum probability signifies in terms of
a physical concept. If we are to understand QM as a physical theory, and not merely as an algorithmic
tool which predicts measurement outcomes, it is clear that we still need to supply a link between the
mathematical formalism and a set of adequate physical concepts which are capable of providing a
coherent account of quantum phenomena. As we might recall Heisenberg’s [36, p. 264] remark: “[t]he
history of physics is not only a sequence of experimental discoveries and observations, followed by their
mathematical description; it is also a history of concepts. For an understanding of the phenomena the
first condition is the introduction of adequate concepts. Only with the help of correct concepts can
we really know what has been observed.”
3 Quantum probability as providing reliable objective information
(of an intensive state of affairs)
Albert Einstein was clearly uncomfortable with the idea of a purely probabilistic theory that would not
be capable to explain, in a reliable manner, why an atom would suddenly choose to decay (or not). A
probabilistic description seemed to clash with an objective account of a state of affairs. But is this really
the case? Is there no way to consider QM as describing an objective state of affairs in probabilistic
terms? In [15], it was argued that one can do so, at the price of giving up the classical representation
of reality in terms of actual (binary) properties. If we pay the price of abandoning the metaphysical
picture provided by actualism and we shift to a description of physical reality in potential terms one can
still interpret quantum probability as providing reliable objective information of a (potential) state of
affairs without —like in the case of Bhomian mechanics— changing the mathematical formalism of the
theory. Our approach also goes clearly against the orthodox positivist viewpoint which assumes that
physical theories are only reliable mathematical devices capable of predicting the future observations
of individual agents. Taking as a standpoint the orthodox mathematical formalism of QM, we have
chosen to investigate the possibility of developing a truly non-classical representation which is able
4The Born rule can be considered as a particular application of the Gleason’s Theorem. More precisely, Gleason’s
theorem proves that the Born rule follows naturally from the structure obtained by the lattice of events in a complex
Hilbert space. However, Born’s rule can be also derived without considering Gleason’s theorem (see [4]).
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to explain in an anschaulich manner what QM is really talking about.5 So, instead of assuming a
presupposed classical representation in terms of ‘systems’ with definite ‘states’ and ‘properties’, we
have argued that it is the Born rule which suggests the need to produce a deep reconsideration of the
way in which physical reality can be theoretically represented. The key to the solution of this problem
is to recognize that it is the probabilistic Born rule itself which supplies the invariant content of the
theory.
Born Rule: Given a vector ψ in a Hilbert space, the quantity 〈ψ|P |ψ〉 allows us to predict the average
value of (any) observable, represented by the hermitian operator P .
Let us remark that this probabilistic statement is completely independent of the choice of any partic-
ular basis (or context); i.e., it is non-contextual.
Orthodoxly, it is argued that one can describe ‘systems’ with definite ‘states’ and ‘properties’. This
encapsulation of reality in terms of the classical paradigm, mainly due to Bohr’s doctrine of classical
concepts,6 has blocked the possibility to advance in the development of a new conceptual scheme.
This is what David Deutsch [23] has rightly characterized as “bad philosophy”; i.e., “[a] philosophy
that is not merely false, but actively prevents the growth of other knowledge.” Taking distance from
the Bohrian prohibition to consider physical reality beyond the theories of Newton and Maxwell, and
simply taking into account the mathematical invariance of the Born rule, it would be possible to
extend the definition of element of physical reality proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [27]
—a notion which, as discussed in extreme detail by Franco Selleri and Gino Torizzi [54], has played
a significant role in the contemporary realist vs. anti-realist debate of QM. Taking into account the
probabilistic nature of the Born rule, the original EPR definition can be naturally extended in the
following manner (see for a detailed discussion [15]):
Generalized element of physical reality: If we can predict in any way (i.e., both probabilistically
or with certainty) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of reality corresponding
to that quantity.
Our definition implies a reconfiguration of the meaning of the quantum formalism and the type of
predictions it provides. It also allows us to understand Born’s probabilistic rule in a new light; not
as providing reliable information about a (subjectively observed) measurement result, but rather, as
providing reliable objective information about a theoretically described (potential) state of affairs.
In this respect, objective probability does not mean that particles behave in an intrinsically random
manner. Objective probability means that probability characterizes in a reliable manner an intrinsic
feature of the objectively described (formally and conceptually) state of affairs. Thus, the reference
of objective probability is completely independent of any subjective choice. This account of proba-
bility allows us to restore a representation in which there exists an objective state of affairs which is
completely detached from the observer’s choices to measure (or not) a particular property —just like
Einstein desired.7
5For a detailed discussion of the intuitive account of our approach we refer to [19, 20].
6Bohr [61, p. 7] argued that “it would be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory may be
evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new conceptual forms.”
7As recalled by Pauli [49, p. 122]: “Einstein’s opposition to [quantum mechanics] is again reflected in his papers
which he published, at first in collaboration with Rosen and Podolsky, and later alone, as a critique of the concept of
reality in quantum mechanics. We often discussed these questions together, and I invariably profited very greatly even
when I could not agree with Einstein’s view. ‘Physics is after all the description of reality’ he said to me, continuing,
with a sarcastic glance in my direction ‘or should I perhaps say physics is the description of what one merely imagines?’
This question clearly shows Einstein’s concern that the objective character of physics might be lost through a theory of
the type of quantum mechanics, in that as a consequence of a wider conception of the objectivity of an explanation of
nature the difference between physical reality and dream or hallucination might become blurred.” See also the discussion
in [54].
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Our proposed interpretation of quantum probability considers the Born rule as providing always
complete and certain knowledge of the theoretically described objective state of affairs; both in cases
where the probability is equal to 1 or 0 and also in cases in which probability belongs to the interval
(0, 1). As it is argued in [19], the shift from an actualist representation of physical reality to a potential
representation implies the shift from a binary valuation of properties to an intensive valuation of
projection operators. This also implies a shift from an actualist understanding of certainty, related
exclusively to the values 0 and 1; to a generalized intensive certainty, which considers on equal footing
all values of probability within the closed interval [0, 1].
Definition 3.1 Let H be a Hilbert space and G(H) be the set of projectors. A potential state of
affairs8 (or PSA for short) is a function Ψ : G(H) → [0, 1] from the graph of observables G(H) such
that Ψ(I) = 1 and
Ψ(
∞∨
i=1
Pi) =
∞∑
i=1
Ψ(Pi)
for any piecewise orthogonal projections {Pi}∞i=1. The numbers Ψ(P ) ∈ [0, 1], are called intensities
or potentia and the elements P ∈ G(H) are called immanent powers. Hence, a PSA assigns in a non-
contextual manner through the Born rule a potentia to each hermitian operator. From a mathematical
viewpoint, each Pi can be identified with the closed subspace given by the image of Pi. If one considers
the closed subspace P generated by the family {Image Pi}i∈N, then
∨∞
i=1 Pi denotes the projector onto
P.
Let H be a separable Hilbert space, dim(H) > 2 and G(H) be the set of immanent powers with
the commuting relation given by QM. Then, any positive semi-definite self-adjoint operator of the
trace class ρ determines in a bijective way a PSA Ψ : G → [0, 1]. A PSA is a non-contextual map
assigning to each hermitian operator Pi a number pi computed via the Born rule; i.e., each P ∈ G(H)
the value Tr(ρP ) ∈ [0, 1].9 The problem of KS contextuality in relation to the definition of physical
reality appears from the impossibility to have a Global Binary Valuation related to the elements
that can be possibly measured. Given a Ψ the KS theorem precludes the possibility to consider the
state of affairs in terms of definite valued properties, 0 or 1, and thus an objective (non-relative)
representation becomes impossible. However, by escaping the metaphysical constraints imposed by
the actualist binary representation, our approach is able to provide a Global Intensive Valuation to all
hermitian operators Pi related to the different decompositions of Ψ, thus restoring the possibility of an
objective (non-contextual) account of the orthodox formalism. Taking the Born rule as a standpoint,
it is possible to consider a generalized notion of valuation which, going beyond the restrictive binary
valuation imposed by actualist metaphysics, is able to escape the idea that quantum contextuality
implies that observations necessarily change the state of the system. Instead of being considered in
terms of the ontic incompatibility of properties, quantum contextuality becomes a natural expression
of the epistemic incompatibility of measurements (see for a detailed discussion [19, section 8]).
In this way, our approach can be derived in a very natural manner from the orthodox formalism and
physical considerations. This also provides a guide regarding the mathematical elements that should
be considered in the creation and development of an objective conceptual representation. There is of
course a number of metaphysical questions that arise when considering a potential realm as a mode of
existence. Some of them have been already addressed in [19, 20]. However, a more detailed analysis
and comparison with some related approaches exceed the scope of the present paper which we leave
8A similar definition is discussed in [39].
9In order to prove that this assignment is bijective, let Ψ : G(H) → [0, 1] be a PSA. Then, by the Gleason’s theorem,
there exists a unique positive semi-definite self-adjoint operator of the trace class ρ such that Ψ is given by the Born
rule with respect to ρ. Hence our claim.
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for a future work.10 In the present article we are interested in the way in which probability is actually
used within orthodox quantum computation and quantum computational logic and the possibilities
that our intensive approach might open within these specific fields of research.
4 The role of probability in quantum computation and quantum
computational logic
Quantum Computation (QC) and Quantum Computational Logic (QCL) are both grounded on the
widespread orthodox understanding of QM in terms of ‘properties’, ‘states’ and ‘systems’. The idea
is to look to classical mechanics and extend these notions in an operational manner. As we know,
the notion of state of a physical system is familiar in classical mechanics. In this case, the initial
conditions (the initial values of position and momentum) determine the solutions of the equation of
motion of the system allowing to follow the system in different instants of time. For any value of
time, the state is represented by a point in the phase space. But of course, within the quantum
framework, the consideration of states requires a substantial modification. In the orthodox scheme
the definition of quantum state depends explicitly on the concept of maximal quantum test. Taking as
a standpoint the idea that QM talks about properties and systems, we want to observe the properties
of a quantum system that can possibly take n different values. If the test you devise allows us to
distinguish among n possibilities, it is said that this is a maximal test. A n-outcome measurement of
those properties implements a maximal test. A test that gives only partial information is said to be a
partial test.11 If a quantum system is prepared in such way that one can devise a maximal test yielding
with certainty a particular outcome, then it is said that the quantum system is in a pure state (for a
detailed description see [50, p. 30, Postulate A]). The pure state of a quantum system is described
by a unit vector in a Hilbert space, Ψ, which in a specific basis —in Dirac notation— is denoted by
|ψ〉. Now, if the maximal test for a pure state has n possible outcomes, the state is described by a
vector Ψ in a n-dimensional Hilbert space. Any orthornormal basis represents a realisable maximal
test. Suppose that we have a large number of similarly prepared systems, called an ensemble, and
we test for the values of different measurable quantities like, e.g., spin, position, etc. In general, we
postulate that, for an ensemble in an arbitrary state, it is always possible to devise a test that yields
the n outcomes corresponding to an orthonormal basis with definite probabilities. If the system is
prepared in state |ψ〉, and a maximal test corresponding to a basis {|e1〉 , ..., |en〉} is performed, the
probability that the outcome will correspond to |ei〉 is given by pi(|ψ〉) = | 〈ei| |ψ〉 |2.
But in general, a quantum system is not in a pure state, it might be also a mixed state (formally
defined below). According to the orthodox account, this may be caused, for example, by an inefficiency
in the preparation procedure of the system, or because, in practice, systems cannot be completely
isolated from the environment, undergoing decoherence of their states. It is important to remark
that the distinction between pure and mixed states is grounded on the possibility of predicting with
certainty a specific outcome of an observable. This, of course, goes back to EPR’s notion of element of
physical reality which also provides an operational definition in terms of the possibility of measuring
with certainty a physical quantity [27]. As Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi [2] argue: “the notion of
‘element of reality’ is exactly what was meant by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, in their famous 1935
article. An element of reality is a state of prediction: a property of an entity that we know is actual, in
10It is important to notice that, since the notion of object is completely dropped, the intensive approach differs
from those which consider vague objects such as Evans [29]. It also differs from those who understand potentiality as
a teleological cause for an actuality to take place; e.g., Heisenberg’s potentiality, Margenau’s latencies and Popper’s
propensities. For a detailed discussion on the topic we refer the interested reader to [16, 18].
11By partial test we mean what Peres [50, p. 29] named incomplete test, i.e. “[...] is one where some outcomes are
lumped together, for example, because the experimental equipment has insufficient resolution.”
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the sense that, should we decide to observe it (i.e., to test its actuality), the outcome of the observation
would be certainly successful.”
The idea of quantum computation was introduced in 1982 by Richard Feynmann and remained
primarily of theoretical interest until developments such as, e.g., Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm and Shor’s
factorization algorithm formulated in the mid-90s, triggered a vast domain of research. In a classical
computer, the information is encoded in a series of bits that are manipulated by logical gates. After
a suitable sequence of steps the output is produced. Standard QC is based on the idea that ‘quantum
systems’ described by finite dimensional Hilbert spaces —specially C2— can be used in analogous man-
ner to classical bits. Analogously to the classical computation case, we consider quantum logical gates
(hereafter quantum gates for short) acting on qubits. QC can simulate any computation performed by
a classical system, but taking advantage of quantum superpositions and quantum contextuality they
can speed up the processes and make algorithms more efficient.
However, there are also interesting processes that cannot be represented as unitary evolutions. A
typical example is what happens at the end of a computational process, when a non-unitary operation,
a measurement, is produced, and the superposed state “collapses” to only one of the terms. This is
understood orthodoxly as a path from a pure state to a mixture; i.e., a probability distribution over
different pure states. Quantum mixtures are then interpreted, in analogous terms to classical mixtures,
as providing the probabilities for such outcomes. Taking mixed states into account, several authors
[3, 10, 26, 30, 31, 34, 59] developed a generalized model of quantum computational processes where
pure states are replaced by mixed states. This new model is known as quantum computation with
mixed states. Let H be a complex Hilbert space. We denote by L(H) the algebra of operators on H.
In the framework of quantum computation with mixed states, we regard a quantum state in a Hilbert
space H as a density operator i.e., an Hermitian operator L(H) that is positive semidefinite and has
unit trace. We indicate by D(H) the set of all density operators in H. A quantum operation is a
linear operator from density operators to density operators such that ∀ρ ∈ D(H) : (ρ) = ∑iAiρA†i ,
where Ai are operators satisfying
∑
iA
†
iAi = I and A
†
i is the adjoint of Ai. In the representation of
quantum computational processes based on mixed states, a quantum circuit is a circuit whose inputs
and outputs are labeled by density operators, and whose gates are labeled by quantum operations. In
terms of density operators, an n-qubit |ψ〉 ∈ ⊗nC2 can be represented as a matrix |ψ〉 〈ψ|. Moreover,
we can associate to any unitary operator U on a Hilbert space ⊗mC2 a quantum operation OU ,
such that, for each ρ ∈ D(H), OU (ρ) = UρU†. Apparently, quantum computation with mixed states
generalizes the standard model based on qubits and unitary transformations.
4.1 Probability in quantum computation
The standard orthonormal basis {|0〉 , |1〉} of C2 (where |0〉 = (1, 0)† and |1〉 = (0, 1)†) is called the
logical (or computational) basis. Pure states |ψ〉 = c0 |0〉 + c1 |1〉 in C2 are called quantum bits (or
qubits, for short) and are coherent superpositions of the basis vectors with complex coefficients c0
and c1. The two basis-elements |0〉 and |1〉 are usually taken as encoding the classical bit values
0 and 1, respectively. By these means and accordingly with the Born rule, a probability value is
assigned to a qubit as follows: let us consider the qubit c0 |0〉+ c1 |1〉. Then its probability values are
p(|0〉) = |c0|2 and p(|1〉) = |c1|2. Here, Born’s rule is understood in purely epistemic terms as providing
the probability to observe either the measurement outcome related to |0〉 or the measurement outcome
related to |1〉.
Both in classical and in quantum computation, a circuit is described in terms of a sequence of gates
that transform an arbitrary state (input) into another state (output) [41]. The Schro¨dinger equation
describes the dynamic evolution of quantum systems, showing how the state |ψt0〉 at the initial time t0
evolves into another state |ψt1〉 at the final time t1 by the equation |ψt0〉 → |ψt1〉 = U |ψt0〉, where U is
a unitary operator that represents a reversible transformation. The Schro¨dinger equation is naturally
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applied in quantum information theory [47]. Indeed, quantum logical gates are unitary operators
that describe the time evolution of a quantum input state. However, let us remark that to perform
a quantum algorithm means to apply a sequence of quantum gates to a quantum input state and to
make a measurement at the end of the process. In standard quantum computation, the evolution of a
state during the computation (and before the measurement) is unitary; hence, the quantum gates that
act before the measurement processes are unitary. But when we want to enclose in the mathematical
framework also the measurement, then we must consider the extended model of quantum computation
where quantum gates are described by quantum operations that are able to represent both the unitary
processing of the quantum gates and the non-unitary process of measurement.
The essential difference between classical and quantum information theory is given by the basic
information quantity, that, in the classical framework, is stored by the classical bit while in quantum
computation is given by the quantum bit introduced above [11, 47]. The qubits allow to manipulate
entangled states that play a crucial role for a large class of computational problems whose computa-
tional complexity is exponential for a classical computer while is polynomial for a quantum one. It is
commonly argued that qubits, because of the superposition principle, are able to store a very larger
amount of information with respect to its classical counterpart. This is one of the main arguments
used by researchers in the field in order to explain why quantum computation is more efficient than
classical computation. However, quite recently, it has been also argued that “contextuality supplies
the magic for quantum computation” [38]. Indeed, quantum contextuality must be also regarded as
one of the main features present within QC. We will come back to these important aspects of QC in
the following sections.
The input of a quantum circuit is given by a composition of qubits that is mathematically repre-
sented by the tensor product operation. Hence, given k qubits |x1〉 , |x2〉 , · · · , |xk〉 ∈ C2 the input state
given by an ensemble of k qubits is given by |x1〉 ⊗ |x2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xk〉 (that, for short, we call quantum
register —or quregister— and we indicate by |x1x2 · · ·xk〉 ∈ ⊗kC2). A quantum circuit is represented
by the evolution of the input quregister under the application of some unitary quantum logical gate
[37, 47]. Also in a quantum computer it is possible to perform a maximal test: it consists in making
a measurement on any output involved in the computation. By following the standard quantum sce-
nario, by repeating several times the same computation it is possible to reach different results. For
this reason the standard result of a computation process is given by running (and measuring) several
times the same circuit. After repeating this procedure a sufficient member of times, what we get is a
frequency distribution over a spectra of outcomes. And as we discussed above, this can be computed
for each possible outcome in terms of the Born rule. Unlike the classical computation, in the quantum
context a computation can provide different outputs for two different reasons. The first reason is given
by the fact that the gates involved in the computation can generate a superposition. For instance,
if we apply the Hadamard H gate [47] to the input state |0〉, in principle we have probability 12 to
get |0〉 and 12 to get |1〉 as output (because H |0〉 = 1√2(|0〉 + |1〉)). Hence, in principle, by applying
n times the computation of the Hadamard gate on the input state |0〉 we should obtain n2 times the
output |0〉 and n2 times the output |1〉. Obviously, this behavior has no classical counterpart. While
in CC at the end of a computation there is only one output determined by the algorithm, in QC even
though there is only one outcome at the end of the computation the results can be as many as terms
in the qubit and —in general— cannot be known before the measurement (or collapse) of the qubit.
As an example, in Figure 1 we show a very trivial computation where the input is given by three
qubits set in the state |0〉 and the gates are: a double negation for the first qubit of the input, a double
Hadamard gate for the second and an Identity gate for the third. All three qubits are measured at
the end of the computation. By exploiting the Quantum Experience resource [24], the computation
process above has been made by a real IBM quantum computer and the same computational process
is replicated by 1024 different runs of the same computational configuration. We then obtain a
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distribution of frequency spanned on all possible outputs. Obviously, the most probable output (see
Figure 2) is given by the state |000〉, but the other possible outcomes have also a non negligible
probability. According to the orthodox viewpoint, this is given by some error that can occur during
the computational process. Indeed, unlike the classical circuit, the real quantum circuit is particularly
sensitive to the action of the environment (which can affect the computation); and this is the second
reason that allows to have different outputs by running different times the same quantum circuit.
Thus, the frequency distribution depicted in Figure 2 can be regarded as a kind of error; i.e., this
frequency distribution can be seen as a tool that allows us to compute, if we apply the circuit of Figure
1, that given the stability of the circuit the state |00000〉 is the most probable result if a measurement
is performed.
Figure 1: Example of a quantum circuit
Figure 2: Frequency distribution
To sum up, in a quantum circuit we have two types of statistical outcomes. One related to the
fact a qubit might be in a superposition state and another statistical spectra related to the intrinsic
stability or error present within the actual quantum circuit created in the lab. While in the first case
the probability can be computed via the Born rule and is purely theoretical, in the latter case, just
like in classical computations, the calculation is purely related to imperfections in the circuit which
can be only known a posteriori, through the actual empirical test of the circuit.
4.2 Probability in quantum computational logic
The theory of Quantum Computation has naturally inspired new forms of quantum logic, such as the
so called Quantum Computational Logic (QCL) [10, 57]. From a semantic point of view, any formula
of the language in QCL denotes a piece of quantum information, i.e. a density operator living in a
complex Hilbert space whose dimension depends on the linguistic complexity of the formula. Similarly,
the logical connectives are interpreted as special examples of quantum gates. Accordingly, any formula
of a quantum computational language can be regarded as a logical description of a quantum circuit.
The kernel idea giving rise to QCL is the assignment of the truth value of a quantum state that
represents a formula of the language. Conventionally, QCL assigns the truth value “false” to the
information stored by the qubit |0〉 and the truth value “true” to the qubit |1〉 . Unlike classical logic,
QCL turns out to be a probabilistic logic, where the qubit |ψ〉 = c0 |0〉 + c1 |1〉 logically represents a
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“probabilistic superposition” of the two classical truth values, where, accordingly to the Born rule,
the falsity has probability |c0|2 and the truth has the probability |c1|2. As in the qubit case, in the
standard approach to QCL it is also defined a probability function p that assings a probability value
p(ρ) to any density operator ρ living in the space of the n-arbitrary dimensional density operators
(we denote this space by D(⊗nC2)). Intuitively, p(ρ) is the probability that the quantum information
stored by ρ corresponds to a true information that after a measurement we obtain either the outcome
related to |0〉 or |1〉.
In order to define the function p, we first need to identify in any space ⊗nC2 the two operators
P
(n)
0 = I
(n−1) ⊗ (|0〉 〈0|) and P (n)1 = I(n−1) ⊗ (|1〉 〈1|) (with I the identity operator) as the two special
projectors that represent the falsity and the truth properties (in fact, outcomes), respectively. Before
this, another step is crucial. In order to extend the definition of true and false from the space C2
of the qubits to the space ⊗nC2 of the tensor product on n qubits (i.e., on an arbitrary quregister),
the standard approach to QCL follows the convention that: a quregister |x〉 = |x1 . . . xn〉 is said to be
false if and only if xn = 0; conversely, it is said to be true if and only if xn = 1. Hence, the truth
value of a quregister only depends on its last component. On this basis, it is natural to define the
property falsity (or truth) on the space ⊗nC2 as the projector P (n)0 (or P (n)1 ) onto the span of the set
of all false (or true) registers. Now, accordingly with the Born rule, the probability that the state ρ
is true is defined as:
p(ρ) = Tr(P
(n)
1 ρ). (1)
In the language of QCL it is usual to distinguish between semiclassical gates (called semiclassical
because, when they are applied to the elements of the computational basis B = {|0〉 , |1〉}, they
replace the behavior of their corresponding classical logical gates) and genuinely quantum gates (called
genuinely quantum because their application to the elements of the computational basis have no
classical counterpart). The semiclassical gates usually involved in QCL are: the Identity I, the
Negation Not, the control-negation (or Xor) CNot and the Toffoli gate T , while the genuinely quantum
gates are: the Hadamard gate
√
I (also named square root of the identity) and the square root of the
negation
√
Not. In particular, the T and the Not gates allow us to provide a probabilistic replacement
of the classical logic in virtue of the following properties:
• p(DNot(ρ)) = 1− p(ρ), for anyρ ∈ ⊗nC2;
• p(AND(ρ, σ)) = p(DT (ρ⊗ σ ⊗ P0)) = p(ρ)p(σ), for anyρ, σ ∈ ⊗nC2.
Let us notice how the conjunction is obtained by the expedient to use the ternary Toffoli gate equipped
by the projector P0 that plays the role of an ancilla.
Taking this approach as a standpoint, and inspired by the intrinsic properties of quantum systems,
the semantic of QCL turns out to be strongly non-compositional and context dependent [13]. This
approach, that may appear prima facie a little strange, has the benefit of reflecting pretty well plenty
of informal arguments that are currently used in our rational activity [12]. A detailed description of
QCL and its algebraic properties is summarized in [10, 13, 11, 44].
5 An intensive probabilistic approach to QC and QCL
The way in which probability is applied in QC and QCL rests on an operational definition of properties
which is grounded in a direct manner on an operational understanding of actual certainty as the
restriction to probability values equal to 1 (or 0). As we discussed above, this idea is captured explicitly
within the operational definition of pure state and EPR’s definition of element of physical reality [27].
Departing itself from a reference to a really existent state of affairs, probability is understood as
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making reference to ‘the future certain prediction (probability = 1) of a measurement outcome’. In
this way, both QC and QCL follow the subjectivist path of probability understood as a reliable tool
for an agent (section 2). However, as we have discussed above (in section 3), there is another possible
interpretation of quantum probability which, departing from the classical metaphysical representation
in terms of ‘systems’ and ‘properties’, is still able to stays close to the orthodox formalism and provide
a non-classical account of what QM is really talking about. This path allows to consider, through
the reference to an intensive realm of existence, a notion of quantum probability which restores an
objective reference to a state of affairs. There are several points which motivate such an intensive
interpretation of probability to which we now turn our attention.
First, the intensive interpretation of the Born rule allows to restore an objective, invariant and non-
contextual representation for QM. Applying the Born rule there is a natural assignment of intensive
values to all hermitian operators which are part of the decomposition of the quantum wave function,
Ψ. This assignment is independent of the context of inquiry, allowing to derive explicitly an intensive
non-contextuality theorem [19, section 7]. Quantum contextuality appears then in a new light, as
making reference to the epistemic incompatibility of measurements instead to the ontic incompatibility
of properties. In this way we drop the idea that the choice of the basis can modify the physical
structure of the system under investigation [19, section 8]. Second, following the ongoing contemporary
experimental research which points to the idea that quantum superpositions must be considered as real
existents in Nature (e.g., [5, 48]), our intensive approach to quantum probability provides an account
of superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to measurement outcomes and mathematical
formalisms [17, 20]. Third, the objectivist intensive interpretation of the Born rule allows to place
on equal footing both pure states and mixtures escaping the present difficulties in the definition of
quantum entanglement, and consequently, the understanding of quantum information processing itself.
This is a point of outmost importance in order to approach an objective definition of entanglement
[21].
All the just mentioned motivations for our intensive approach to probability have also interesting
consequences for a possible development of both QC and QCL. From a philosophical perspective, the
intensive approach might allow a realist understanding of the quantum computational processes in
terms of interactions that are really taking place in the world. This, instead of the instrumentalist
account which simply argues that “it somehow works” so you should better “shut up and calculate!”.
From a theoretical perspective, the implementation of an intensive account of quantum probability
might allow a deep reconsideration of the way in which both inputs and outputs are considered and
represented in QC. Since all terms of a qubit are considered as elements of physical reality (quantified
in intensive terms) both inputs and outputs might necessarily require a multi-target approach to QC
and QCL —such as the one proposed in [55]. Another important aspect is that the empirical study of
intensive values is necessarily linked to a statistical analysis in which single measurement outcomes play
no essential role. Single outcomes simply don’t provide enough information to account for intensive
values —even in extreme cases where probability is equal to 1. Intensive certainty, when empirically
tested, always requieres a repeated series of measurements. Finally, it is interesting to point to the
fact that the explicit consideration of different possible basis in QC and QCL, which can be applied
through the implementation of qdits [56], might open the door to analyze the contextual aspect of
quantum computations [38] right from the start, not only taking into account what happens within
the computational process, but also by considering the output and the input as explicitly contextual
(or basis dependent). The just mentioned aspects imply not only a shift in some kernel aspects of the
modeling of QC and QCL, it also implies a different way of analyzing the obtained data.
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6 Conclusions: reliability and probability
In this paper we have discussed and analyzed different interpretations of probability in the context
of QM. Firstly, we have considered the classical statistical interpretation of probability in terms of
ignorance about an actual state of affairs. Secondly, the subjectivist interpretation of probability which
makes reference to the agents’ rational choice when betting on a specific outcome. And thirdly, we
provided an interpretation of objective probability which allows us to discuss the quantum formalism as
making reference to an objective state of affairs described in intensive terms. As we have shown, while
in orthodox QC and QCL, probability is used and understood as making reference to the possibility
of observing different measurement outcomes, within the intensive approach to QC and QCL it is
possible to understand quantum probability as making reference to an objectively described state of
affairs. This new intensive approach to quantum probability opens new possibilities and advantages
which we plan to investigate in future works. Here we point to the fact that such a proposal justifies
the requirement of a multi-target statistical analysis.
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